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The purpose of this study is to assess the readiness of 44 OIC member countries 
to form a currency union and to test whether the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
criteria remain relevant to a large region like the OIC. Large geographic size is subject 
to socio-economic and geographic disparities. This study employs the OCA-index to 
estimate the degree of readiness of the OIC to form a currency union. Five selected 
criteria –business cycle synchronization, trade openness, inflation similarity, the size 
of the economy, and distance – were employed to determine the OCA using Ordinary 
Least Squares regression. The findings of this study estimate that 63 percent of pairs of 
countries in the OIC are ready to form a currency union. The selected OCA’s criteria 
present the best-fit variable in explaining the OCA for the OIC. This paper verifies 
that economic and geographic heterogeneities are not the main obstacle to forming a 
currency union. This study provides an important contribution to the theory of OCA 
primarily in clarifying the application of the OCA conditions in a large observation like 
the OIC, which comprises many countries and many blocks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the studies related to the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) assess the 
readiness of countries to form a currency union within a particular economic 
bloc, such as the Gulf Countries Council (GCC), the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS) and others. Since the studies cover a large geographical size like 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which consists of 57 member 
countries and at least nine economic blocs, an interesting question is the extent to 
which the OCA theory is able to provide a comprehensive explanation for such 
an observation. For example, what is the optimal size of a currency union fit the 
criteria of symmetry? Large geographical size is sensitive to social, economic and 
geographic heterogeneity. Ex-ante OCA criteria theoretically require symmetry, 
synchronization, convergence, and similarity of shock in output and price as 
necessary conditions (De Grauwe, 2006). 
Islamic countries acknowledge that forming a currency union was one of 
the strategic agenda items planned a half-century ago (Bacha, 2006). An initial 
assignment was planned in 1945 by twenty-two Islamic nations, which were 
affiliated in North Africa, and the Middle East (MENA) to form a single currency 
called the Dinar Arab (Kamar, 2004). Six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries declared a target date to form a single currency called the ‘Khallegi’ in 
2010’, which was followed by the proposal for a monetary union in 2015 by the 
ECOWAS (Khan, 2009). Unfortunately, neither was implemented and now require 
re-planning. Three Islamic nations in ASEAN have made a significant contribution 
in proposing the ASEAN Monetary Unit (AMU) that was designed as a parallel 
currency for the ASEAN Single currency (Falianty, 2006). One of the initial signs 
of progress was the promotion of the Trade Preferential System (TPS) within OIC 
member countries that came into force in 2009 (Lee, 2011).
The OIC has made significant progress during the last two decades. The OIC 
share in the world’s GDP increased sharply from only seven percent in 2000 to 
almost 20 percent in 2013 (SESRIC, 2015). Intra trade among the OIC member 
countries reached 15 percent of the total OIC exports and increased more than five 
times during the last two decades. Islamic countries that were classified as low-
income countries by the World Bank dropped from 22 countries in 2000 to only 
four countries in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). 
The OIC economies experience a wide social and economic gap (Table 1) with 
some Islamic countries enjoying a GDP per-capita of more than US$50,000, while 
others remain below US$1,000. Eleven countries have a GDP of above US$50,000, 
whereas seven countries are still below US$5,000. Eight OIC member countries 
are grouped in the countries with the lowest Human Development Index in 
the world. The geographic dispersion of the OIC area is relatively extreme. The 
largest distance from the west part (Mauritania, Africa) to the east part (Brunei 
Darussalam) is 16,000 kilometres. Two hundred and forty-four pairs of countries 
have a range distance of more than 7,000 kilometres (Table 1).
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Almost all the OIC member countries are already in the stages of implementing 
a common market. This means that the opportunity for the OIC to implement 
a monetary union is just one step away. Although a common market within the OIC 
has become an important precondition for the formation of a single currency, this 
is complicated by the socio-economic and geographic dissimilarities. This paper 
tries to assess the feasibility of 44 OIC member countries to form a currency union 
using the OCA-index. This paper employed five independent criteria – business 
cycle synchronization, trade openness, inflation similarity, the size of an economy, 
and the distance against the OCA-index. The structure of this paper is organized 
as follows. Section II presents the literature review. Section III provides the 
methodology of the estimation. Section IV discusses the findings of this study, 
and the last section provides the conclusion and recommendations. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Robert Mundell (1961, p. 658), the founder of OCA theory, proposes ‘ex-ante’ 
conditions that countries may join a monetary union. He offers non-exchange rate 
means for the adjustment mechanism under a balance of payment disequilibria 
through factors mobility. Factor mobility, primarily labour mobility, can maintain 
the internal balance by the movement of factors of production away from the deficit 
region to the surplus region. He also cited that a similar pattern and the direction of 
shocks are a key requirement for the OCA. The following proponents, McKinnon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969), extend the other OCA criteria, which consider the degree 
of openness, the size of the economy, and product diversifications. According to 
McKinnon (1963), openness is associated with the efficient allocation of resources 
and symmetry of the exchange rate. The size of the economy indicates the capacity 
of the countries to make adjustments facing the balance of payment disequilibrium 
through foreign reserve channels. Product diversification – no single dominant 
product of export – is the main driver to accelerate monetary unification (Kenen, 
1969). The OCA criteria are now developing many variances that involve inflation 
similarity, financial-market integration, and fiscal integration (Silva and Tenreyro, 
2010). 
Table 1.
Economic and Geographic Heterogeneity in OIC
Gap GDP Gap GDP per-capita gap HDI gap Geographic Dispersal
High GDP between 
US$500,000 and 
US$2,3000,000
(11 countries) 
GDP per-capita 
between US$50,000 
and US$88,000
 (5 countries)
HDI between 
0. 7 and 0. 9
(20 countries)
The range of distance 
between 7,000 km and 
16,000 km.
(244 pairs of countries)
Low GDP between 
US$1,400 and 
US$5,000
(7 countries)
GDP per-capita 
between US$600 and 
US$1,000
(5 countries)
HDI between 0.3 
and 0.5
(7 countries)
The range of distance 
below 2,000 km.
(167 pairs of countries)
Sources: SESRIC (2015)
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OCA eliminates the exchange rate risk by sharing in a common currency. 
Within the member countries, exchange rates are irrevocably pegged but fluctuate 
jointly vis-à-vis other currencies (De Grauwe, 2006). Members of the union may 
enjoy benefits, such as more efficient trade through the reduction of transaction 
costs, greater factor mobility, and co-movement of shocks (Horvart, 2003). OCA 
also has costs, such as the loss of monetary autonomy, and loss of exchange rate 
sovereignty (Mundell, 1961; Mongelli, 2008). OCA reshapes the monetary structure 
from one country-one currency to a multinational one market-one money (Rose, 
2000; Alesina and Barro, 2001).
Frankel and Rose (1998) criticise the old-OCA theory by considering that the 
OCA-criteria are endogenous (ex-post). The countries that fail to fulfil ex-ante 
criteria may attain the OCA criteria ex-post. The pieces of evidence from Eurozone 
exhibit the co-movement of shock and substantial trade growth after they join 
the union (Gouveia and Correia, 2013). Krugman (1991) specifies that asymmetry 
emerges in times of openness, resulting from increasing economies of scale, which 
lead to regional specialization, and regional concentration of industries, which 
then drive regional economic imbalance. The symmetric and asymmetric cycles, 
therefore, are not static in nature, but may fluctuate in any circumstances, closed 
or open economies, ex-ante or ex-post.
Studies supporting the feasibility of a single currency in Islamic countries 
produce mixed results. Observing 24 OIC countries, Lee (2011) finds that it is only 
feasible for Jordan, Tunisia, Syria, Gabon, Brunei and the UAE to join the OCA. 
Laaban and Limas (2002) find that GCC countries are far from a currency union. 
Ruzita, Hamid, and Norma (2011) identify only 11 commodities out of 50 observed 
commodities that could be integrated within the OIC. The weak integration within 
the OIC is due to the limitation of product diversification, which polarizes on gas 
and oil. The rapid contemporary development of the Gulf countries means that 
it is not possible to form a currency union yet (Raison, 2011). However, opposite 
findings considered that a monetary union is feasible for the GCC (Kandil and 
Trabelsi, 2010; Bali and Osman, 2008). Bacha (2006) find that it is more feasible for 
the GCC to form a currency union than for the Agadir Nation (Jordan, Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Morocco). 
The relationship between currency and geography has been documented 
in the OCA literature. By definition, the optimum currency area is a regional 
neighbouring area. How large should a single currency be? Ghosh and Wolf 
(1994) said that restricting monetary unions to geographically neighbouring areas 
implies high costs. The cost is the stabilization cost to maintain a single currency. 
They estimate that the stabilization costs of a single currency in the Euro area 
reaches 2.5% of GDP each year. Some studies identified that distance is strongly 
associated with the trade intensity, but the correlation may follow different 
directions depending on how it is proxied (Gouveia and Correia, 2013; Frankel 
and Rose, 1997).
III. METHODOLOGY
This study develops an OCA-index to estimate the readiness of OIC members 
in forming a currency union. This study follows the OCA-index developed by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997, p. 764); rewritten as follows:
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where, SD denotes standard deviation, Δ log eij is the logarithm of the 
standard deviation of a change in the nominal exchange rate in end-years between 
country i and country j. The study follows the classification from Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997), which categorizes three levels of feasibility. One is the prime 
converged countries (the index values range from zero to less than 0.025), second 
is the converging countries (the index values range from 0.025-0.077), and the last 
is little-converged countries (the index values are more than 0.077). 
This study estimates the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of multiple regression 
models to explain the variants of OCA. This study employs five OCA determinants 
– business cycle synchronization, trade openness, the size of the economy, inflation 
similarity, and the distance. This study observes 964 pairs of countries, which 
derives from the combination of 44 OIC members. To compute the OLS regression 
estimation, this study detects the data normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test (K-S test), multicollinearity using Pearson Correlation, and heteroscedasticity 
using the White-test. 
The multiple regression is as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
where SD (Δlogeij) is the logarithm of the standard deviation of a change in the 
nominal exchange rate in end-years between country i and country j. 
SD(BCSij) is output disturbances as the logarithm of the standard deviation of the 
difference of relative output in the two countries. 
TRADEij Is the means of the sum of export (x) and import (m) in the two 
countries. 
(4)
INF is inflation similarity. CPI is the consumer price index measured by means 
of the difference in consumer price index between two countries:
(5)
SIZE is the GDP in the constant price in US Dollars measured by the logarithm 
of the sum of total output (GDPij) between two countries. GDP is the Gross 
Domestic Product at the current price. 
(6)
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DISTANCE is the distance range between two countries measured in kilometres 
(km). 
The source of the data is available from The Statistical, Economic and Social 
Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC): https://www.
sesrtcic.org. Distance data were retrieved from http://www.distancefromto.net/. 
Of the 57 Islamic countries, 44 are observed in this study, which employs serial 
data from 1990 to 2015.
IV. RESULT AND FINDING
4.1. OCA Index between Countries
The study finds that 63 percent of 946 OIC pairs of countries are classified as prime 
converged and converging countries. Only 37 percent of which are not feasible 
(see Table 2). This result is relatively balanced compared with previous studies. In 
Europe, for example, only 71 percent of 14 European countries were nominated as 
prime converged and converging countries when it was assessed using the OCA-
index (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997). The United Kingdom, France, and Italy 
fall into the little-converged countries. So far, no economic blocs successfully met 
full prime convergence when they started forming a currency union. 
The specific finding from this study shows that 60 country pairs with OCA 
indexes are equal to zero. The OCA-indexes equal to zero indicate perfect 
symmetry and stability of exchange rate. These 60 country pairs are located in the 
GCC, West Africa, and Central Africa. The GCC bloc has pegged its currencies 
on a permanent basis with the U.S. Dollar for nearly 25 years, except Kuwait 
(OIC, 2012). Central Africa and West Africa have pegged their currency to the CFA 
Franc since 1945 (Uzonwanne, 2012). These three blocks are the replication of the 
so-called quasi-monetary union (Saidi and Scacciavillani, 2010).
(7)
Table 2.
Classification of the Feasibility of Optimum Currency Area 
in Islamic Nations
Classification by OCA-
Index
Classification of Countries
Numbers of 
Country Pairs
Percent
0.00-0.025 Prime converged countries 357 38%
•   0.0000 -60
•   0.0001-0.02490 -297
0.025-0.077 Converging countries 237 25%
0.077-2.95 Little converged countries 352 37%
Total 946 100
Source: Author calculation.
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Table 3.
The Degree of Integration among OIC Members 
(Calculated by the OCA-Index)
Number Countries
SD
(∆ log e)
Prime 
Converged 
to 
(countries)
Converging 
to 
(countries)
Little 
Converged 
to
(countries)
Classification 
1 Comoros 0,0192575 28 5 10 Prime
2 Guinea 0,0202606 28 5 10 Prime
3 Mauritania 0,0206014 28 5 10 Prime
4 Uganda 0,0239057 28 6 9 Prime
5 Jordan 0,0194135 28 5 10 Prime
6 Kuwait 0,0220617 28 5 10 Prime
7 Pakistan 0,0183260 28 5 10 Prime
8 Indonesia 0,0231681 28 6 9 Prime
9 Bangladesh 0,0111122 27 6 10 Prime
10 Maldives 0,0172750 27 6 10 Prime
11 Morocco 0,0341316 25 10 8 Prime
12 Gambia 0,0425762 24 11 8 Prime
13 Benin 0,0259512 23 11 9 Prime
14 Burkina Faso 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
15 Cameroon 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
16 Chad 0,0259512 23 11 9 Prime
17 Cote D'Ivoire 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
18 Gabon 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
19 Mali 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
20 Niger 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
21 Senegal 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
22 Togo 0,0259522 23 11 9 Prime
23 Lebanon 0,0270948 23 11 9 Prime
24 Guinea-Bissau 0,0506465 17 18 8 Prime
25 Bahrain 0,0000000 15 18 10 Prime
26 Oman 0,0000000 15 18 10 Prime
27 Qatar 0,0000000 15 18 10 Prime
28 Saudi Arabia 0,0000000 15 18 10 Prime
29 Syria 0,0000000 15 18 10 Prime
30 UAE 0,0000000 15 18 10 Prime
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Table 3.
The Degree of Integration among OIC Members 
(Calculated by the OCA-Index) (Continued)
Number Countries
SD
(∆ log e)
Prime 
Converged 
to 
(countries)
Converging 
to 
(countries)
Little 
Converged 
to
(countries)
Classification 
31 Algeria 0,0659396 5 30 8 Converging
32 Afghanistan 0,0747822 5 30 8 Converging
33 Guyana 0,0539186 7 28 8 Converging
34 Sierra Leone 0,0591093 6 28 9 Converging
35 Malaysia 0,0995491 2 21 20 Converging
36 Iraq 14,683,098 0 0 43 Little
37 Egypt 12,532,468 0 0 43 Little
38 Libya 0,3275067 0 0 43 Little
39 Mozambique 29,467,032 0 0 43 Little
40 Tunisia 28,037,246 0 0 43 Little
41 Turkey 0,5781454 0 0 43 Little
42 Iran 0,1587881 1 2 40 Little
43 Brunei 0,1595696 1 2 40 Little
44 Nigeria 0,1109377 1 9 33 Little
Source: Author calculation. SD (∆ log e ) is OCA-index.
4.2. OCA Index Among Blocs
Table 3 shows how far a country is capable of integration with other countries. 
No country is able to integrate with all countries. Only nine countries – Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Comoros, Guinea, Mauritania, Jordan, and 
Kuwait – succeeds in achieving maximum integration with 28 countries of the 44 
observed countries. Five countries – Afghanistan, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Guyana, 
and Malaysia – are dominant in the converging category. These countries may 
potentially move to the prime convergence category in the future. In contrast, six 
countries – Egypt, Libya, Mozambique, Tunisia, Turkey, and Iraq – do not integrate 
with all countries. Egypt, Libya, Iran, and Iraq experience internal political 
instability. Turkey, Tunisia, and Brunei Darussalam have poor OCA-indexes due 
to their exchange rate movement appreciating during the last decade, which is 
opposite to the depreciation trend that coincides with the majority of the Islamic 
nations.
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The linkage among economic blocs in the OIC looks closer, as most economic 
blocs are integrated into strong and moderate categories. Three economic blocs 
– South Asia, Middle East, and Africa – have a strong intra-bloc integration, 
while the other two blocs – ASEAN and South America – have a relatively weak 
integration. Within the South Asia bloc, Afghanistan has the weakest integration. 
Afghanistan experienced an appreciation of its currency, which sets it apart from 
the common depreciation trend of its neighbouring countries. A group of North 
African countries – Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Tunisia – have little 
integration with the rest of Africa. In ASEAN, only Indonesia has strong integration 
with other blocs. 
4.3. Testing the OCA Criteria
Table 5 shows the simultaneous regression model that observes 946 pairs 
of countries. The t-test demonstrates five independent variables (BCS, INF, SIZE, 
TRADE, and DISTANCE) strongly associated with the OCA. The coefficient 
of determination (R2) is 60 percent and the significance level of the F test is less 
than 5 percent. These results are not much different from previous studies in 
Europe and Asia. A parallel finding by Calderon, Chong, and Stein (2003) proved 
Table 4.
Integration among Blocs in the OIC
Arab (Middle 
East)
Africa ASEAN South 
America 
South Asia 
Arab (Midde 
East)
n=12
P (60)* P (73) P (9) P (2) P (26)**
C (12) C (96) C (2) C (9) C (8)
L (38) L (95) L (23) L (2) L (5)
Africa
n=24
P (272)* P (18) P (4) P (45)**
C (78) C (19) C (15) C (27)
L (198) L (39) L (4) L (20)
ASEAN
n=3
P (2) P (0) P (6)
C (4) C (3) C (1)
L (2) L (1) L (7)
South America
n=1
P (0) P (1)
C (0) C (3)
L (0) L (1)
South Asia
n=3
P (11)*
C (3)
L (7)
Noted: n= number of observations – P is the prime converged countries, C is the converging countries, and L is the little converged 
countries. Parantheses denotes the number of k-combinations from a given set S of n element a-k combination. *) deals with a 
strong intra-blocs integration. **) indicates a strong inter-blocs integration.
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that OCA criteria are relevant in explaining the variety of OCA in large (147 
developing countries) observations. This study suggests that the geographic and 
economic disparities emerging in the OIC do not appear to be the main obstacle in 
forming a currency union. 
The strong link between inflation similarity and the OCA in Islamic countries 
is widely documented (Echchabi et al., 2011; Bacha, 2006). Since most Islamic 
countries are not the price takers, their inflationary patterns are very sensitive 
to changes in foreign currency. Countries that have a very high inflation rate 
(above 10 percent) tend to experience low levels of integration, such as Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Egypt. The business cycle synchronization 
has a positive impact on the OCA. Countries with a negative rate of growth, 
such as Brunei Darussalam, Iraq, and Libya, have a relatively weak integration. 
Interestingly, it has been asserted that co-movement of price is easier to achieve 
than output in most of the Islamic bloc (Fasano and Iqbal, 2003; Raison, 2011).
Table 5.
OLS Regression Estimation of OCA’s Criteria
 +  + e
t-stat 12.417 8.75 -3.411 28.836 2.451
(.000)*** (.000)*** (.001)*** (.000)*** (.014)**
Observation = 784 R2 = 0.597 Adjusted R2 = 0.594 
S.E = 0.083336                                   F = 230.568 F sig. = 0.000
The size of the economy is associated with OCA, which is in line with 
McKinnon (1963), who suggests that large economic size is capable of maintaining 
a stable exchange rate. However, in Europe, the relationship between SIZE and 
OCA contradicts McKinnon’s prediction, which might be because the GDP level 
of most European countries has reached optimum capacity, and a slight rise in 
GDP may encourage an overheating economy. This research indicates that the 
rise in trade in the OIC is not strong enough to push monetary integration. The 
imbalance of trading structures and little diversification of products among OIC 
countries is a common reason for the OIC (Al-Mawali, 2015). This study highlights 
that most Islamic nations are strongly integrated with each other even under 
severe geographical dispersion. Although proximity is the preferred condition, as 
the standard OCA theory and the graffiti model propose, it is not obligatory. 
The weaknesses of this study arise from the OCA index itself. Whether an 
OCA is a good index depends on the characteristics of observation. For example, 
the poor economic blocs might produce the same level of OCA-index as the 
rich ones, even though their economic performance is clearly different. As long 
as the participating countries are in a similar condition, even under insufficient 
circumstances, they may be considered as feasible candidates. The similarity, 
therefore, might be translated into negative terms. This is why most Islamic 
nations are strongly integrated, even though their macroeconomic indicators are 
relatively disfavoured. 
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V. CONCLUSION
This study concludes that the OIC is ready to form a currency union because 
63 percent of the pairs of countries fall under the classification of prime converged 
and converging countries. Sixty pairs of countries have an OCA-index value equal 
to zero (very symmetrical volatility of exchange rate), and exist in three economic 
blocs – the GCC, West Africa, and Central Africa. The selected OCA’s criteria 
present the best-fit criteria in explaining the OCA-index for the OIC. This study 
proves that price integration (inflation) is much easier to achieve than output 
integration (BCS and TRADE) in the OIC. This direction is out of step with the 
integration proposed by Balasa, and theoretically moves it from one of economic 
integration (output) to monetary integration (price). 
This study provides an important contribution to the theory of OCA particularly 
in explaining the application of the OCA criteria in a large observation like the 
OIC. This study asserts that the economic and geographical heterogeneity, that is 
always considered to be a disadvantage, is not a serious hindrance to forming a 
currency union. The future prospects of the OIC’s monetary union are promising 
since the socio-economic gaps among the OIC countries tend to be improving with 
the progress of time. 
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